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Introduction 
The phenomenon of arms proliferation accelerated in the international system hard on the 
heels of the end of the Cold-War period when arms left in from stockpiles made their way into 
unstable regions. Some estimates have placed the number of small arms in circulation at about 
500 million, enough for one in every ten people on earth.1 Bah notes that, “of the approximately 
500 million illicit weapons in circulation worldwide, it is estimated that 100 million of these are 
in sub-Saharan Africa with eight to ten million concentration in the West African sub-region 
alone.”2 In addition, available data shows that of the 30 to 50 armed conflicts occurring between 
1989 and 1995, more than 95 percent took place in developing countries and were fought 
primarily with small arms.3  By one reliable estimate, more than 3.6 million people were killed in 
internal warfare in the 1990s and half of all civilian casualties were children with an estimated 
200,000 child soldiers in Africa out of a total figure of 300,000 worldwide.4 According to one 
study, in 1990 an African was twice more likely to die because of war than a non-African.5 
In Africa, arms proliferation has led to “general insecurity, increased criminal violence, 
privatization of violence and security in the form of proliferation of mercenaries, private military 
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companies and paramilitary outfits.”6 The mere presence of guns belies alternative conflict 
resolution strategies. More so, the easy availability of weapons and a lack of state-based control 
fuel violence even after official war have ended. The economy of guns has a hand in this 
perpetuation, as both war and post-war economies use guns as a reliable currency.7  
This paper locates the armed conflict in the oil-rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria within 
the context of unrealized expectations and consequent frustration and aggression. I argue that 
while small arms do not directly cause conflict, their stockpiles fuels violent behavior and 
sustains conflict. In taking the availability of small arms in the Niger Delta as an intervening 
variable in lieu of a dependent variable, I offer a nuanced explanation of the Niger Delta conflict. 
I further argue that one of the reasons these convenient weapons circulate so widely and so easily 
is that there is a demand for them. This demand is due to the failure of the social contract 
between the state and its citizenry. The logic is simple: people accept state authority so long as 
the state equitably delivers economic goods and services and guarantees security for its citizens. 
When this social contract is breached, social disorder prevails and arms become the surrogate.  
The rest of this paper is divided into four parts. The second examines the sources and 
theoretical perspectives to arms proliferation in the Niger Delta. The third part explores the 
armed conflict in Niger Delta at a general level followed by the theoretical debates that attempt 
to comprehend the conflict within the frameworks of relative deprivation, and frustration and 
aggression theories. The fourth part explores the dynamics of resistance movements in the Niger 
Delta. The fifth part critically interrogates the amnesty and post-amnesty program of the 
Nigerian state against the backdrop of whether it provides the basis for sustainable peace that 
will mark the end of armed groups, arms proliferation and violent conflicts in the region.  
Sources and Theoretical Perspectives to Arms Proliferation in Nigeria 
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In Nigeria alone there are approximately one million8 to three million9 small arms in 
circulation. According to one reliable source, 80 percent of the weapons in civilian possession 
had been obtained illegally,10 due to strict laws on civilian possession. In turn, the illegality 
makes it intractable to track flows and possession. But how do weapons transit into the country? 
For the most part, weapons make their way into the country across land borders and through sea 
ports. In turn, these weapons transfer into the hands of armed groups, national dealers, political 
and community leaders, and individuals. Since Nigeria has lengthy and porous borders, a number 
of airports, and numerous ports along the southern coast, smuggling and cross-border trade are 
difficult to detect and monitor.11 Added to this, inadequate staff, vehicles, and resources make 
the task of customs officials, the police, and the navy all the more Herculean.  
While many are certain that small arms and light weapons are flowing alarmingly into the 
country as corroborated by the presence of foreign-made weapons in circulation, the exact 
entrance routes of these weapons remain largely terra incognita. A number of transit countries 
are often implicated. These include the neighbouring countries of Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and 
Niger as well as Gabon and Guinea-Bissau.12 Other avenues include Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, 
South Africa, Turkey, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Kosovo, and Serbia.13 The three most notorious arms 
smuggling frontiers in Nigeria are reportedly in the south-west (Idi-Iroko in Ogun state and Seme 
in Lagos state), in the south (the port city of Warri in Delta state), and in the north-east at the 
border with Niger and Cameroon (Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states).14 Warri has been dubbed 
the “hub of the gun trade” in the Niger Delta.15 Its location in the Delta, as well as the vibrant 
demand for small arms in that restive area of the country, make this a logical place for the 
reception of shipments.16 A number of towns are also notorious for the availability of small arms, 
including Asaba, Benin city, Aba, Onitsha, Enugu, Owerri, Awka, and Port Harcourt.17 Arms 
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that come into the country through the southern ports may be distributed in this southern region, 
or they move further north to primary distribution points, and then on to secondary distribution 
points. Some of these weapons will move further north, but the north seems to have extra sources 
of small arms through the borders with Niger and Chad in the north-east. Entry points here 
include Maigatari, Nguru, and Mallam Falori.18  
Most prominent among the sources of illegal small arms and light weapons include 
“purchases from international and national arms dealers, sales and rentals by serving and retired 
security personnel, sales by returning peacekeepers, sales of recycled weapons from 
decommissioning exercise, oil-for-arms exchanges in the Delta region, and purchases of locally 
produced craft weapons.”19 In addition to these sources, illicit weapons are also obtained through 
thefts from dealers, armouries, and residences; seizures from security officials during robberies; 
and in clashes with other armed groups.20  
A major reason why small arms circulate so widely and so easily is due to a vibrant 
demand for them. In both developed and developing countries, a thriving market for both licit 
and illicit suppliers is provided by people and armies. Weiss observes that, “where there is a lack 
of human security, real or perceived, there is inevitably a surplus of guns in the hands of people 
who feel safer armed with the ability to protect themselves (whether they can successfully do so 
or not).” 21 On the part of the development community, there has been an attempt to engage small 
arms issues from this relatively novel perspective. In one UNDP publication titled Development 
Held Hostage: Assessing the Effects of Small Arms on Human Development, Peter Batchelor and 
Robert Muggah argue that:  
Narrow supply-side approaches that focus on the weapons and on ex-combatants are only 
part of the solution. Nor can the broad range of socio-economic impacts of small arms be 
dealt with in a framework that focuses exclusively on weapons reduction. Because small 
arms play a key role in undermining development gains in conflict-affected, post-conflict, 
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and stable societies alike, they should be of concern to the development community rather 
than the exclusive preserve of the security and disarmament community.22 
 
Many local approaches to firearms-fuelled violence are demand-and-conflict-prevention 
based while the international and national response tends to be emergency-triggered. I argue that 
there is a need to rethink this approach. From a demand vantage point, weapons cease to be the 
locus of intervention. Instead, the focus is shifted to gun-users and the aim is to influence the 
buyers in the market, in addition to regulating suppliers and enforcing relevant laws. Weiss aptly 
notes that “by bringing demand-reduction measures to the fore, the problem of small arms 
proliferation can be debated in new fora. This brings gun-fuelled, conflict-related problems out 
of traditional defense and foreign affairs areas and brings them under the lens of traditionally 
‘humanitarian’ policies.”23 In addition, the burden of crime and violence prevention is lifted off 
the back of policing and brought to broader, more powerful levels of government control.  
According to the United Nations Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small 
Arm, state-level failure to provide security is the causal basis of demand-based proliferation: 
“When the State loses control over its security functions and fails to maintain the security of its 
citizens, the subsequent growth of armed violence, banditry and organized crime increased the 
demand for weapons by citizens seeking to protect themselves and their property.”24 At the 
cultural level, the report maintains that “possession of military-style weapons is a status symbol, 
a source of personal security, a means of subsistence, a sign of manliness and, in some cases, a 
symbol of ethnic and cultural identity.”25 This culture of weapons drives demand mostly “when a 
State cannot guarantee security to its citizens or control the illicit activities in which these 
weapons are utilised.”26 Despite the cogent argument for the role of demand as a driver of arms 
proliferation, the report’s recommendations were supply-side measures.  
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Small arms are extremely difficult to get rid of because they are sturdy, durable, and 
reusable: “Once present in a country they tend to stay there, either fuelling crime or flowing over 
national boundaries to serve the needs of neighbouring conflicts.”27 Moreover, small arms are 
lethal, but easy to use. A single rapid-fire assault rifle can fire hundreds of rounds a minute. In 
restive regions with bleak economic forecasts, former combatants have little hope of finding a 
job in civilian life. The option of keeping a gun and seeking mercenary work becomes more 
beguiling than turning over their only chance at earning a livelihood. This is the case in West 
Africa where youths from Sierra Leone, where there was an extensive demobilisation, 
disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) process, are rumored to have gone on to fight in Liberia 
or Cote d’Ivoire.28 Although poverty, unequal access to resources, high unemployment rate, inter 
alia, contribute to instability, “it is the presence of guns that enables conflict to escalate into the 
type of violence that is beyond state control or mediation.”29  
Moving on, I argue that it is the failure of the Nigerian government to meet the 
fundamental needs of the people – human security in particular – that led to the collapse of the 
social contract, which eventually put the state and society at dagger-drawn opposition. To 
properly fathom this collapse and the emergence of what is generally known as the “Hobbesian 
Niger Delta,” it is expedient to search for its etiology within the context of both the endogenous 
and exogenous factors. This is because “the international sociopolitical and economic contexts 
have overbearing effects on the local conditions especially in Nigeria’s oil basin.”30  
During the Cold War years, African states received ample financial assistance from the 
international financial institutions (IFIs), while the super powers where relentless in their pursuit 
of hegemonic interests and ideological supremacy which saw the continent in a vantage position 
for financial and military aid from Moscow and Washington—two behemoths. These sources of 
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support, coupled with the “relative” economic boom of the early independence years, enabled 
African governments to maintain peace due to the state-driven expansionism in the socio-
economic sector.31  
The economic boom of the late 1960s and early 1970s, started to show signs of 
depreciation by the late 1970s/early 1980s owing to the increasing negative socio-economic 
factors. Subsequently, Africa’s economic downturn ballooned into a full-blown economic crisis 
due to the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 that made oil price rise and fluctuate. The multiplier effect 
of the economic crisis was such that the abilities of African government to guarantee citizens’ 
welfare were seriously undermined and their legitimacies slowly eroded. In a desperate bid to 
rescue the situation, “African states responded by borrowing from the Bretton Wood Institutions 
with the acceptance of the neo-liberal, antidevelopmental Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) 
for the stabilization and recovery of their economies.”32  
SAP policies support the “rolling back of the state” in the economy. In particular, the 
policies call for the privatization of public enterprises, removal of subsidies and welfare support 
from social services, and neo-liberal market reform based on the belief that the state was 
obstructing economic growth and development by spending too much on welfare benefits in 
health, education and other subsidies.33 The implementation of SAP became counterproductive 
as it further weakened the state’s legitimacy by aggravating the pre-SAP social crisis. In 
addition, the gap between the rich and the poor widened, thereby reinforcing uneven 
development in a manner amplifying political tensions.34 Meanwhile, rural poverty led to ever 
increasing teeming populations of urban poor caused by rural to urban drift of people in search of 
employment and greener pastures to support their families. Worse still is the social instability 
fuelled by a vibrant population of disenchanted, marginalized, and pauperized people who can 
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only become a ready pool of recruitment for ethnic zealots who cashed in adroitly on the 
dissatisfaction and insecurity of the people.35  
The loss of control of the economies by the African government, and the state’s inability 
to salvage its sapping population, fractured the basis of national unity and put the state and the 
society at dagger-drawn opposition to each other. 36 Thus, African states “lost their power, 
legitimacy, and national cohesion since they failed to fulfill their own promises of the social 
contract.”37 The social contract theory of arms postulates that “citizens transfer the possession of 
weapons to a constituted authority (for example, the sovereign and the state) with the agreement 
that the state will provide and guarantee people’s security (in all its connotations) while the 
ownership of such weapons is in the hands of the people which gives them (that is, citizens) the 
opportunity to withdraw and reclaim self-defense when states fail to honour their own 
obligations of the contract.”38 Ibeanu argues that in so far as the legitimacy of the state at the 
local, state, and federal levels remain contested by a vast majority of people in the Niger Delta, 
“they will continue to contest the right of the state and its agencies to monopolize society’s 
instruments of violence.”39 
Prologue to the Niger Delta Conflict and Overview of Theoretical Perspectives  
 
One can begin by posing the question: Why does a poor continent have such a magnitude 
of stockpiled small arms? What explains this contradictory state of affairs between economic 
underdevelopment (poverty) on the one hand and proliferation of arms and conflicts on the other 
is the “strongest expression of the injustice in the paradox of wealth that characterizes situations 
of conflicts in Africa – the fact that those who produce wealth are the poorest and those who are 
wealthy take the wealth by force.”40 Thus, the reason for people to arm themselves is not only 
due to their odious socio-economic conditions but also the yoke of exclusion, injustice and 
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exploitation that they bear daily. In this context, small arms serve two functions: “they abet in 
sustaining injustices and also offer hopes for redressing injustices.”41 This confirms Naylor’s 
avowal that the demand for small arms is a “surrogate for demand for social injustice, and the 
firearm is the capital good intended to bring that objective.”42 This is very evident in the case of 
the Niger Delta armed conflict. 
Nigeria is one of the Third World countries where the proliferation of small arms is 
manifested in crisis proportions and “its society has become fully militarized and enmeshed in 
the culture of the gun.”43 More than any other areas of the country, the Niger Delta is emblematic 
of this tendency with a high degree of intensity where different oil-producing ethnic minority 
groups through their various social movements, are constantly contesting exploitation and 
fighting for a share in the country’s treasury of natural resources.44 According to the UNDP, if 
left unaddressed, the unrest in the Niger Delta “could tip towards outright warfare.”45  
The Niger Delta’s peculiar swampy geography and extensive access to international 
waterways make the region an important conduit for arms proliferation activities in Nigeria. In 
1956, oil was discovered in the Niger Delta by Shell D’Archy.  In 1958 Nigeria became an oil 
exporter with a production level of 6,000 barrels per day. Despite an extremely volatile period 
that included two military coups in 1966 and the civil war of 1967-70 that erupted in the oil rich 
region, oil production mushroomed to a peak of two million barrels per day in the 1970s.46 By 
1979, prices rose to US$40 per barrel – largely due to conflicts in the Middle East – and thus 
Nigeria’s annual export earnings rose from US$1 billion to US$26 billion; accounting for 95 
percent of Nigeria’s foreign exchange earnings and about 85 percent of federal revenue.47 In 
2007, statistics indicated that about 23,183.9 billion barrels of crude oil were produced in the 
Niger Delta which amounts to a national revenue of 29.8 trillion naira.48 
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Despite the oil surfeit, the situation in the Niger Delta presents a mammoth discrepancy. 
Available figures are telling: there is “one doctor per 82,000 people, rising to one doctor per 
132,000 people in some areas, especially the rural areas, which is more than three times the 
national average of 40,000 people per doctor.”49 An abysmal 27 percent of people in the region 
have access to safe drinking water and 30 percent of households have access to electricity, both 
of which are below the national averages of 31.7 percent and 33.6 percent, respectively.50 
According to Hazer and Horner, “mismanagement of oil revenues since independence, 
corruption, the failure to redistribute oil wealth, the utter lack of development in the Delta, and 
environmental damage have hardened the resolve of those living in the region to agitate for 
change, and increased popular support for those groups fighting for a better deal.”51 As such, the 
general attitude in the Niger Delta is not whether there will be more trouble, but a question of 
when and where.  
In theoretical debates, attempts have been made to comprehend the Niger Delta conflict 
within the frameworks of relative deprivation (RD) and frustration and aggression theories. The 
concept of RD is clearly expressed in the works of two of its finest exponents: James Davies52 
and Ted Robert Gurr. “Relative deprivation” is the term used to describe the tension that 
develops from a discrepancy between the “ought” and the “is” of collective value satisfaction.53 
The emphasis of this hypothesis is on the sense of deprivation. As Runciman puts it: “if people 
have no reason to expect or hope for more than they can achieve, they will be less discontented 
with what they have, or even grateful simply to be able to hold on to it.”54 Thus, this approach 
insists that at the basis of individual and group’s grievances is the idea of unrealized 
expectations.  For his part, Gurr argues that the “greater the deprivation an individual perceives 
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relative to his expectation the greater his discontent; the more widespread and intense is 
discontent among the members of a society, the more likely and severe is civil strife.”55  
The Niger Delta is emblematic of the insupportable gap between value expectation and 
value position. A prime example is the region’s oil which though has the potential to create 
compelling economic opportunities for majority of the population has paradoxically entrenched 
poverty and served as a recipe for conflict, repression, corruption and environmental damage. 
Lamenting the sense of relative deprivation in the Niger Delta, the Ogoni leader Ken Saro-Wiwa 
declared: “There is tremendous awareness in Ogoni now… there is no woman or child who does 
not know… that the Nigerian government is cheating them and that the ethnic majorities in 
Nigeria are cheating them… They also know that… something has to be done to stop it…”56  
What RD furnishes is an explanation of how the failure of non-violent measures such as 
peaceful protests, media and publicity, and litigation to yield the desired results has resulted in 
the radicalization of the struggle for redress through violent means. As Omotola argues, “the 
sense of deprivation shared by the [Niger Delta] people is deep-rooted, demanding more 
attention than is currently the case, before it degenerates into another Gulf war.”57The 
frustration-aggression theory provides the psychological dynamic for the proposed nexus 
between the intensity of deprivation and the potential for collective violence. The most 
influential formulation of frustration-aggression theory was proposed by Dollard and his 
colleagues at Yale in 1939. The crux of the theory is that the occurrence of aggressive behaviour 
presupposes the existence of frustration and the existence of frustration tends to lead to some 
form of aggression. 
The frustrations of ethnic minority groups in the Niger Delta are well founded. The 
population bears the brunt of environmental degradation resulting from the operations of oil 
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companies and the oil bunkering (illegal tapping of oil pipelines) of armed groups. In particular, 
oil spills and gas flaring have dealt a fatal blow to agricultural land, water sources, and air 
quality. In return, the population has received only a modicum of support from the government, 
which benefits from the high revenues earned from selling crude oil overseas.  
Legally, the population has no control over the oil that sits beneath their land, and no 
claim to the revenues accrued through its sale. The provisions of the Land Use Act (1978) served 
to entrench the nationalisation policy which vested ownership and control of all land and the 
resources therein in the Federal Government. While the percentage of revenue received by oil-
producing states climbed to 13 percent from less than 2 percent under military rule, this funding 
goes to state coffers, with few visible signs of it being spent to improve the lives of people in 
local communities.58 According to Watts, “by any measure of social achievement the oil states 
[in Nigeria] are a calamity,” characterised by “nestled shacks, broken-down canoes, and children 
who will be lucky to reach adulthood.”59 The prevailing situation is partly responsible for the 
sustained grievances and the rise of resistant movements in the region. 
Since the early 1990s, the Niger Delta has witnessed the emergence of several armed 
groups. According to one June 2004 anti-cult law in Rivers state, armed groups in the state 
number close to 100.60 Thus, the Delta has become a haven for the proliferation of small arms, 
which the militias have put to use on different occasions.61 For example, armed groups and 
gunmen have hatched nefarious activities, including the use of violent tactics in the form of 
kidnappings, battles with security forces, clashes with one another and car bombs. Increasingly, 
such groups are demonstrating sophisticated tactics and weaponry, raising concerns regarding 
future violence.62 Attacks against oil installations and sabotage of oil pipelines have also been 
rampant.63 As of 2008, such attacks against oil installations had mushroomed, forcing the 
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shutting of estimated 25 to 40 percent of Nigerian’s oil production and exports warranting the 
ample loss of revenues and profits to the state-oil transnational’s alliance. Thus, from a daily oil 
production of 2.5 million barrels of oil in 2005, by late 2008 the figure had plummeted to around 
1.9 to 2.1 million barrels due to the disruption to production and supply.64  
The Nigerian state has often responded to the demonstrations in the Niger Delta through 
violent and repressive measures. This became acute under military rule.65 This includes the 
emplacement of draconian decrees such as the one promulgated by the Abacha regime 
prohibiting the Ogoni people’s demand for the right to self-determination. 66 Ake eloquently 
describes the reckless (ab)use of military might in the Niger Delta as the “militarization of 
commerce” and “privatization of the state.”67 The state’s excessive use of force has served as a 
recipe for the militarization of the area, hence creating a genuine ground for anarchy.68  
The Dynamics of Resistance in the Niger Delta 
By way of a prelude, violence is usually defined as “the intentional use of physical force 
or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, 
that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, 
maldevelopment or deprivation.”69 Specifically, the concern here is with armed violence, which, 
for the purposes of this paper, is defined as the carrying out of a violent act with “any material 
thing designed or used or usable as an instrument for inflicting bodily harm.”70 This section 
provides a brief historical narrative of the trajectory of resistance in the Niger Delta and state 
responses culminating in the recent amnesty offered to militants from the region.71 
Isaac Boro and the First Revolt  
 
The first serious attempt to secede in Nigeria and to confront the oil multinationals and 
the Nigerian government was led by Major Isaac Adaka Boro in 1966. With about 150 volunteer 
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forces, Isaac Boro declared the Niger Delta Republic (NDR) on 23 February 1966 at Tantonabau 
in the Riverrine areas of the former Eastern region. In his autobiography, published 
posthumously, Boro explained his motivation for the revolt when he writes that “year after year 
we are clenched in tyrannical chains and led through a dark alley of perpetual political and social 
deprivation. Strangers in our country!”72 Addressing his army before the war, Boro declared:  
Today is a great day, not only in your lives, but also in the history of the Niger 
Delta. Perhaps it will be the greatest day for a very long time. This is not 
because we are going to bring haven down, but because we are going to 
demonstrate to the world what and how we feel about oppression. Before today, 
we were branded robbers, bandits, terrorists or gangsters but after today, we 
shall be heroes of our land.73 
 
...remember your seventy-year-old grandmother who still farms before she eats; 
remember also your poverty stricken people; remember too your petroleum 
which is being pumped out daily from your veins, and then fight for your 
freedom.74 
 
Although the 12 days revolution was quashed by the federal government, it set the scene 
of the Niger Delta struggle for survival. As Omotola notes, the first revolt “succeeded in 
awakening the ethnic consciousness of the minorities of the Niger Delta as much as the 
establishment of several civil society groups of various types.”75 
Ken Saro-Wiwa, MOSOP, and the Agony of the Ogonis 
In the early 1990s the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) was 
established under the leadership of playwright and environmental activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and 
traditional heads of various Ogoni clans. MOSOP, which became an instant rallying point for the 
Ogonis, planned to take action against the state and oil multinationals for the oil exploitation and 
attendant environmental dislocations in Ogoniland. MOSOP’s mandate was to campaign non-
violently to (1) promote democratic awareness; (2) protect the environment of the Ogoni people; 
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(3) seek socio-economic and physical development for the region; (4) protect the cultural rights 
and practices of the Ogoni people; and (5) seek appropriate rights of self-determination for the 
Ogoni people.76  
In October 1990, MOSOP presented The Ogoni Bill of Rights (OBR) to the Government 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Therein, MOSOP demanded (a) political control of Ogoni 
affairs (b) the right to control and use a fair proportion of Ogoni economic resources for Ogoni 
development (c) the right to protect the Ogoni environment and ecology from further degradation 
and (d) adequate and direct representation in all Nigerian national institutions.77 These demands 
suggest that what the Ogonis desired was ‘a right to self-determination through the creation of an 
exclusively Ogoni state’.78 MOSOP linked up with transnational rights advocacy networks such 
as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Rainforest Action Group, Sierra Club, and 
Friends of the Earth in an attempt to globalize its local resistance and increase its pressure on the 
government and on Shell, the largest multinational oil operator in the Niger Delta. The 
internationalization of the Ogoni struggle soon unsettled the Nigerian government and oil 
multinationals as it exposed their human rights abuses against oil-producing ethnic minorities.  
Beginning December 1992, the conflict intensified on the back of fresh demands by 
MOSOP from the three major oil stakeholders in Ogoniland—Shell, Chevron, and the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). These demands included: (1) payment of US$6 billion 
for accumulated rents and royalties for oil exploration since 1958; (2) payment of US$4 billion 
for damages and compensation for environmental pollution; (3) immediate cessation of 
environmental degradation, especially gas flaring in Yorla, Korokoro, and Bornu; (4) immediate 
covering of all exposed high-pressure oil pipelines; and (5) initiation of negotiation with the 
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Ogoni people. To meet these demands, MOSOP announced a 30 days ultimatum.79 It was in this 
phase of the conflict that overt violence was applied by the Nigerian government.  
The oil multinationals, in alliance with the Nigerian government, chose to meet 
MOSOP’s demands with repressive measures and increased security. To this end, the Nigerian 
government imposed draconian laws designed to command compliance in the Niger Delta, 
particularly in Ogoniland. These included: (1) The proscription of ethnic minority associations; 
(2) the confinement, detention, arbitrary conviction and/or imprisonment of outspoken oil 
minority elites; (3) the violent suppression, by military force, of protests, demonstrations and 
uprisings by oil minority communities; and (4) the official declaration of ethnic minority 
agitations for self-determination, or any disturbances of oil production activities for that matter, 
as a seditious or treasonable offense punishable with the death penalty!80  
At the end of the 30-day ultimatum, the Ogonis staged a mass rally at Bori on 3 January 
1993. The mass action peaked when MOSOP led a total Ogoni boycott of the 12 June 1993 
presidential elections. Following mass protests that were designed to stop contractors from 
laying a new pipeline for Shell in Ogoniland, government security forces raided the area to quell 
the unrest. In the ensuing chaos, 27 villages were allegedly raided, resulting in the death of 2,000 
Ogoni people and displacement of 80,000.81 These attacks sounded the death knell of the mass 
action phase of the Ogoni struggle which would seem to have been the goal of the state.  
The Ogoni struggle suffered a fatal blow on 21 May 1994. Saro-Wiwa and eight other 
Ogoni members were found guilty of inciting Niger Delta youths to murder four left-winged 
Ogoni chiefs and, consequently, sentenced to death by hanging. The chicanery and hanging of 
Saro-Wiwa was a deliberate attempt by the Nigerian government to eliminate the pivotal figure 
of opposition around which a united Niger Delta front could emerge.82 Moreover, the execution 
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was not so much a sign of disrespect for international opinion but “a sign to Nigerians 
themselves that there was no escape from the state’s totalitarian apparatus and that nobody in the 
whole world could save them.”83 Following Saro-Wiwa’s death, the Ogoni struggle lost its initial 
steam, aided by a combination of state repression and leadership bickering. 
The Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) and the Kaiama Declaration 
In December 1998, the IYC was formed at a meeting of Ijaw activists and representatives 
from 40 Ijaw clans from across the coastal states of southern Nigeria. It comprises a 
confederation of youth associations of the Ijaw ethnic group of the Rivers, Bayelsa, and Delta 
states of the Niger Delta. Its overriding goal was to “fight against the marginalisation, neglect, 
underdevelopment, militarization, and repression of the minorities in the Niger Delta by the 
federal government and multinational oil companies.”84 Perhaps, the major achievement of the 
IYC was the famous Kaiama Declaration of 11 December 1998, made at a meeting of 5,000 
youths drawn from 500 communities, 40 clans, and 25 organisations held at Kaiama in Bayelsa 
State. The Kaiama Declaration insisted that “we cease to recognise all undemocratic decrees that 
rob our peoples/communities of the right to ownership and control of our lives and resources, 
which were enacted without our participation and consent” and demand the “Ijaw control of Ijaw 
oil’.85 For the IYC, ‘any oil company that employs the services of the armed forces of the 
Nigerian State to “protect” its operations will be viewed as an enemy of the Ijaw people.”86  
Like MOSOP, the IYC appealed to the youth and ordinary people by drawing upon Ijaw 
traditional beliefs about justice and resistance, including the use of Egbesu, an Ijaw deity of war, 
whose real significance lay in Ijaw cosmology as a symbol of spiritual protection. In late 
December 1998, the IYC mobilized the Ijaw through Operation Climate Change, a program of 
non-violent protest demanding that all oil companies leave the Niger Delta before the end of the 
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year. Rather than engaging the IYC in a political dialogue or responding to the demands made in 
the Kaiama Declaration, the military government sent in troops backed by warships that 
forcefully quelled the protests in January 1999.87  
Under the democratic rule of Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007), the practice of deploying 
soldiers to shoot-to-kill protesting indigenes, and to raze down communities, became a standard 
state response mechanism. A prime example is the invasion of Odi (a town populated by the 
Ijaws) by state security forces in revenge for the murder of 12 policemen by youths in the town 
on 20 November 1999. Over 2000 Odi inhabitants were killed in the state-sanctioned massacre. 
Obasanjo justified this dastardly action by arguing that the brutal measure was necessary to deter 
communities from killing security officials as a way of pressing for their demands.88  
The continued militarisation of the Niger Delta contributed to the feeling in some circles 
that the state and the oil multinationals would neither listen to the demands of the local people 
nor respect their human rights. Such views were informed by the apparent “failure” of peaceful 
protest to effect any meaningful change. Importantly, the return to armed resistance in the region 
reminiscent of the Boro’s revolt is largely linked to the aftermath of the Kaiama declaration. The 
Kaiama declaration set the stage for violent resistance that finally escalated to an insurgency with 
the emergence of several armed groups with the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger 
Delta (MEND) being the most organized and formidable. 
MEND and the Militarisation of Resistance 
MEND is the most recent and insurgent face of Ijaw pan-Delta resistance. According to 
MEND and its supporters, the Niger Delta people have suffered from decades of environmental 
degradation due largely to unregulated pollution produced by oil companies in the area. This is 
facilitated by national state policies that continue to deprive local communities of their land in 
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favour of foreign oil interests and capitalist expansion. The London-based Economist magazine 
describes MEND as a “political organisation that wants a greater share of Nigeria’s oil revenues 
to go to the impoverished region that sits atop the oil. In fact, it is more of an umbrella 
organisation for several armed groups, which it sometimes pays in cash or guns to launch 
attacks.”89 This resonates with a statement released by the group’s spokesperson, Jomo Gbomo:  
MEND is an amalgam of all arm bearing groups in the Niger Delta fighting for 
the control of oil revenue by indigenes of the Niger Delta who have had 
relatively no benefits from the exploitation of our mineral resources by the 
Nigerian government and oil companies over the last fifty years.90  
According to Ike Okonta, MEND is not so much an “organisation” but an idea in which 
many civic, communal, and political groups, each with its own specificity and grievances, have 
bought into.91 Elsewhere, Okonta locates the emergence of MEND within “the lethal cocktail of 
economic deprivation, military dictatorship and worsening environmental crisis” in the Niger 
Delta, and its tapping into “the fifty year Ijaw quest for social and environmental justice in the 
Niger Delta.”92 Membership in MEND is reputed to be fluid, with militants involved with several 
groups simultaneously. Jomo Gbomo indicates that the group's members are “volunteers.”93 
Furthermore, a majority of MEND members are reported to be from the Ijaw ethnic group—the 
largest ethnic group in the Niger Delta.  
MEND has been linked to attacks on petroleum operations in Nigeria as part of the 
conflict in the Niger Delta, engaging in actions including sabotage, theft, property destruction, 
guerrilla warfare, and kidnapping. In a January 2006 email, MEND warned the oil industry: “It 
must be clear that the Nigerian government cannot protect your workers or assets. Leave our land 
while you can or die in it.... Our aim is to totally destroy the capacity of the Nigerian government 
to export oil.”94 MEND is notorious for kidnapping foreign oil workers and demanding huge 
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ransom for their release. For example, in January 2007 alone, “at least 50 foreigners were taken 
hostage... That compares to a total of around 70 foreigners snatched in the whole of 2006.”95 
Moreover, attacks by MEND on oil facilities have featured prominently in global media; in some 
cases, the group has given information prior to attacks, showing the inability of state security 
forces to forestall its attacks. MEND gained world publicity through its threats to cripple the 
Nigerian oil exports. True to its threat, attacks by MEND forced oil production shutdowns in 
Nigeria of up to 800,000 barrels per day or over 25 percent of the country’s oil output. By March 
2009, crude oil exports had fallen to 1.6 million bpd, down from 2.6 million in 2006.96  
MEND has constantly reminded the public that their action was propelled by the desire 
for justice and fairness. According to the group’s spokesperson, ‘We are asking for justice. We 
want our land, and the Nigerian government to transfer all its involvement in the oil industry to 
host communities which will become shareholders in these oil companies.’97 It was in the face of 
this insurgency that the Nigerian state introduced amnesty as a way of ending the attacks.  
 
The 2009 Amnesty, Armed Groups, Arms Proliferation and Violent Conflict 
In April 2009, the idea of an amnesty for repentant militants was first mooted by the late 
President Yar’Adua in an urgent bid to curb relentless MEND attacks on oil facilities in 
Nigeria.98 According to Ndutimi Alaibe, National Coordinator and Chief Accounting Officer of 
the Federal Government Amnesty Program for Niger Delta ex-militants:  
The amnesty program was a response to security conditions in the Niger Delta 
at the time. It was a response by the then President to reduce fundamentally the 
violence that was taking place. After consultation with stakeholders, it was 
decided that there was a need to get the militants to lay down their weapons. 
That was the basis of the amnesty which was meant to stabilize, consolidate 
and sustain the security conditions in the Niger Delta region, as a requisite for 
promoting economic development in the area’.99  
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The Amnesty policy, which was announced by the late President Yar’Adua on 25 June 
2009, stated that militants who freely surrender their arms within 60 days (6th August 2009 to 
4th October 2009) will not be prosecuted for the crimes committed in the process of disrupting 
the Nigerian oil industry. President Yar’Adua made clear that the amnesty deal was aimed at 
reintegrating and rehabilitating militants willing to surrender their arms into the Nigerian 
society.100 According to Korpamo-Agary, the disarmament and subsequent reintegration of the 
militants is only a first step towards bringing the urgently needed development to the Niger Delta 
regions since there cannot be development without peace.101 
The disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of militia groups, closely associated 
with the amnesty deal in the Niger Delta, was a policy recommended by the Niger Delta 
Technical Committee (NDTC)—a committee established in 2008 by the Nigerian government to 
determine appropriate peace-building strategies in the restive region.  Made up of scholars and 
opinion leaders drawn from the region, the 40 member committee consulted widely with 
stakeholders, including the combatants, before making its recommendations. In part, the policy 
recommendations on DDR states that the Federal government should: (1) establish a credible and 
authoritative DDR institutions and process including international negotiators to plan, 
implement, and oversee the DDR programs at regional, state and local government levels; (2) 
grant amnesty to all Niger Delta militants willing and ready to participate in the DDR program; 
(3) workout long-term strategies of human capacity development and reintegration for ex-
militants; and (4) exclude from amnesty and criminalise the activities of those militants 
committed to the DDR process and unwilling to surrender their arms.102  
In particular, state governments were required to support the rebuilding of communities 
destroyed by military invasion, and establish youth development centers and community 
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demobilization and reintegration committees to enhance reintegration and capacity building.103 
State governments were also required to provide social amenities, including health centers and 
schools at the site of former militant camps.104 In July 2009, a budget of $145 million was 
controversially announced for the Amnesty deal intended for 20,192 registered militants. There 
was an appreciable lack of clarity about exactly how the budget was to be spent, and the 
proportion which was to be allocated to monthly allowances versus the proportion allocated to a 
broader reintegration and rehabilitation package. Former combatants who registered for the 42-
month period of training, reintegration and rehabilitation in government designated residential 
training centers received monthly allowances of $409.78 over the same period. This was three 
times the average salary for a young public sector worker in Nigeria but just a little higher than 
the foot soldier salary, which stood at US$400 in 2006.105  
However, the criteria used to establish eligibility for inclusion were largely unclear, with 
the numbers of intended “beneficiaries” widely believed to have been inflated. According to 
Abubakar Kari, anyone can claim to be an ex-militant to make some money: “A plain, 
unemployed youth who was never involved in any militancy, realizing that they could easily 
make money by claiming or pretending to be militants, have been going into militant camps and 
so on and demanding that they too should be accommodated within the amnesty program.”106  
The amnesty deal saw over 15,000 militants surrender their weapons at the expiry date of 
the Disarmament and Demobilisation phase. Weapons recovered during the disarmament process 
included ‘2,760 assorted guns, 287,445 ammunitions of different calibre, 18 gun-boats, 763 
dynamite sticks, 1,090 dynamite caps, 3,155 magazines and several other military accessories, 
such as dynamite cables, bulletproof jackets and jack-knives’.107 Many militants also turned 
themselves in as well, albeit major militant groups like MEND viewed the amnesty with 
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suspicion since it made less room for dialogue and it does not address the underlying causes that 
gave rise to the struggles in the first place. According to Ndutimi Alaibe, “these militants... 
wanted assurances... Some of them went to the mundane level of committing me to take an oath 
with them.”108 The popular belief is that militants only handed in a small fraction of their arms as 
most of them doubted the government’s commitment to the amnesty.109  
Although the amnesty has led to a lull in violence in the Niger Delta since 2009, I argue 
that it affords only a cosmetic and pro tem solution to the decades-old armed conflict. 
Specifically, cash payouts to armed militants and proposals to give oil-bearing communities a ten 
percent stake in state oil revenues fail to seriously address the underlying issues of government 
corruption, political sponsorship of violence and environmental degradation’ that continues to 
fuel resistance in the Niger Delta. Indeed, what prompted the amnesty was not the environmental 
tragedy in the Niger Delta but the urgent need to stem the tide of MEND’s crippling attacks on 
oil facilities in Nigeria in order to maximize oil revenues. 110 Quite aside, in an interview posted 
in the Daily Independent newspaper (Nigeria), Ndutimi Alaibe noted that:  
Some of the challenges facing the (Amnesty) program today have to do with the 
background of some of the militants themselves and the initial process of de-
briefing. You may take them abroad, and on arrival find that the individual is not 
even psychologically prepared and then indulge in negative habits and in the 
process, they get deported. There is therefore need to properly engage the ex-
militants to determine their career aspirations before re-integration.  The program 
has recorded fundamental success in terms of some of them who have been 
trained in specialised disciplines; and more can still be achieved. There are those 
who have graduated as pilots. Managing 26,000 ex-militants through 
reintegration can be very challenging. The cooperation of all stakeholders is 
imperative.111 
Conclusion/Recommendation 
 
More than three years after the amnesty program, Niger Delta communities still suffer 
from grinding poverty and underdevelopment. These communities continue to lack basic 
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infrastructural facilities such as paved roads, pipe-borne water, and stable power supply, while 
unregulated oil pollution continues to compromise the land and water upon which their 
livelihood depends. Yar’Adua’s announcement of a presidential pardon in 2009 is essentially 
conceived in this paper as a means of buying off militants and re-establishing oil and gas 
production in the Niger Delta without dealing with the root causes of sustained grievances in the 
region. Moreover, the protracted illness and subsequent death of Yar’Adua – the main architect 
of the amnesty program – meant that little real progress was made on the reintegration and 
rehabilitation front. Former militants complained bitterly that promised allowances and training 
were either not forthcoming or ill suited to their needs. Its shortcomings notwithstanding, the 
Niger Delta amnesty program is important because it pursues a tactic of negotiation and 
promotes non-killing alternatives to resolving violent conflicts. 
In 2013, the Niger Delta remains the site of severe injustices which continue to sustain 
grievances and threaten the fragile peace introduced by the Amnesty program. The injustice in 
the region largely concerns the way public resources are acquired, distributed or shared and used 
by relevant state authorities. Stories of state officials stealing resources earmarked for the 
development of the region are commonplace. For example, D.S.P. Alamieyeseigha, former 
governor of the oil-rich Bayelsa State, was found to be in possession of four properties in 
London valued at about €10 million, plus another property in Cape Town valued at $1.2 million. 
About €1 million was recovered at the Royal Bank of Scotland in London and more than $240 
million in Nigeria. This is in addition to foreign bank accounts traced to Cyprus, Denmark, the 
United States and Bahamas.112 In another case, in December 2007, the Nigerian Economic and 
Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) stunned Nigeria by arresting James Ibori, the former 
governor of Delta State. Ibori had presided over a state that had remained impoverished and 
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dysfunctional under his watch despite massive inflows of oil revenue. Ibori, who was jailed by a 
London court, pleaded guilty to embezzling over $250 million in public funds that should have 
been used to improve the lives of the Delta people.113  
In the light of the above, ordinary people in the Niger Delta now see the local elites as 
part of the corrupt national elites in Nigeria. Unfortnately, many of the leaders of the resistance 
movement in the Niger Delta have been “settled” and become millionaires in the national capital, 
Abuja. This indicates the lack of any true vision or depth to their struggle for justice and 
survival.  Clearly, these leaders lack an alternative vision of justice or development that is 
superior to that of the corrupt national elites. If they did, and have been able to demonstrate that 
on a small scale, that could have seriously challenged the Nigerian government as it will show all 
Nigerians the possibility of an alternative way to use public resources. 
In conclusion, I recommend that Nigeria should intensify its ongoing efforts to diversify its 
economy to shrink its huge dependence on crude oil which still accounts for the vast bulk of 
foreign exchange earnings. This is the only option which in the long run can reduce the country’s 
overreliance on crude oil and its associated tensions.  
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